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I. INTRODUCTION
Street photographers, like snipers, pride themselves on
stealth.' Camouflaged in nondescript clothing, they wander the streets
undetectable, armed, and on the hunt. When they find their mark,
they act quickly. As the famous twentieth-century street photographer
1. Street photography is a genre of photography that features people in candid situations
in public places. For purposes of this Note, "street photography" will be used broadly to mean
photography that occurs in public. It is well-established that people have a right to privacy in
their homes and other nonpublic arenas. The terms "public" and "public places" apply to areas
outside the borders of an individual's home or private property. Streets, parks, beaches, malls,
amusement parks, and athletic fields are all examples of public places.
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Henri Cartier-Bresson described: "The creative act lasts but a brief
moment, a lightning instant of give-and-take, just long enough for you
to level the camera and to trap the fleeting prey in your little box."2
While methods of "trapping prey" vary from shooter to shooter,
the mission remains the same-staying as covert as possible and
catching an unknowing subject in a candid pose.3 In the formative
years of street photography, Cartier-Bresson concealed himself by
wrapping a large handkerchief around his camera and pretending to
blow his nose while discretely taking a picture.4 He also covered his
camera in black tape to conceal any shiny parts that might give him
away to his subjects.5
Today's street photographers are armed with a new generation
of weapons that hardly need concealment. The rise of miniaturized
and digital technologies has taken street shooting to a whole new
level. In a world where companies compete to make the smallest, most
inexpensive cameras, surreptitious photography runs rampant. For
example, cell-phone cameras and "dime-sized spy cameras" make it
possible for photographers to shoot their subjects from virtually any
angle without detection.6 However, as technology advances, so does
the potential scope and harm from photographic invasions of a
subject's privacy.
One of the most disturbing products of these developments is
the birth of "upskirt photography."7 As its name suggests, upskirt
2. PHOTOGRAPHY YEAR: 1980 EDITION, at 22 (Time-Life Books ed. 1980). Henri Cartier-
Bresson (1908-2004) was a French photographer and perhaps the most influential figure in the
development of street photography. He is arguably the father of modern photojournalism and a
master of candid photography.
3. In fact, street photographers have dedicated entire websites to the art of stealth. See,
e.g., Mason Resnick, Street Photography, 2002, http://web.archive.org/web/20020726123004
Ihttp://www.nelsontan.com/articles/strtfoto/strtfoto.htm ("A long focal length lens will allow you
to shoot the details, and slip away without being noticed."); Fine Art by Arthur Durkee, Stealth
Photography, http://www.arthurdurkee.net/stealthphotography.html (last visited May 10, 2010)
("The real 'trick' [to street photography] ... is to remain unobtrusive and keep a low profile. A
small camera which you know well can be very helpful, since you can shoot from the hip; people
are often aware that you are taking a photo only when you raise the camera to your eye and look
through the viewfinder.").
4. Kingdoms of the World in a Moment, EcONOMIST, Aug. 7, 2004, at 67 (profiling Henri
Cartier-Bresson).
5. Id.
6. Josh Blackman, Omniveillance, Google, Privacy in Public, and the Right to Your Digital
Identity: A Tort for Recording and Disseminating an Individual's Image over the Internet, 49
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 313, 360 (2009); Clay Calvert & Justin Brown, Video Voyeurism, Privacy,
and the Internet: Exposing Peeping Toms in Cyberspace, 18 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 469, 471
(2000).
7. See David D. Kremenetsky, Insatiable "Up-Skirt" Voyeurs Force California Lawmakers
to Expand Privacy Protection in Public Places, 31 MCGEORGE L. REV. 285, 285 (2000).
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photography involves taking pictures of women up their skirts. There
are currently over one hundred websites featuring upskirt images,
indicating just how in-demand the product is. 8 This form of
unauthorized photography can have devastating effects on subjects.9
An upskirt photograph draws attention to a private aspect of a
person's life that would not have been seen by the naked eye and that
the subject likely would not have consented to put on public display.10
In this regard, upskirt photographs infringe on basic precepts of
human dignity." They also often cause outrage, mental suffering,
shame, or humiliation for their subjects. 1 2
Despite these severe injuries, an individual photographed in
public has nearly no recourse under current civil law.13 Street
photography thrives because an individual has no right to privacy in
public places. 14 Instead, the law protects the photographer, not the
victim.
8. Id. at 287 ("Demand for 'up-skirt' pictures has produced more than one hundred
Internet sites devoted to this genre.").
9. For further discussion of the negative consequences photography can have on
individuals, see infra note 34 and accompanying text (citing Andrew Jay McClurg, Bringing
Privacy Law Out of the Closet: A Tort Theory of Liability for Intrusions in Public Places, 73 N.C.
L. REV. 989, 1029 (1995)).
10. McClurg, supra note 9, at 1029; see Philip Greenspun, Street Photography, PHOTO.NET,
Jan. 2007, http://photo.net/learn/street/intro ("The best thing about street photography is that it
is possible for the final viewer of a print to see more than the original photographer.").
11. See Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean
Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 970-71 (1964) (an individual's privacy is essential to his dignity);
J. Braxton Craven, Jr., Personhood: The Right to Be Let Alone, 1976 DUKE L.J. 699, 702-03
(discussing the importance of privacy for individuality and personhood); Daniel R. Ortiz, Privacy,
Autonomy, and Consent, 12 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 91, 92-97 (1989) (reasoning that privacy is
central to an individual's sense of autonomy).
12. Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Property, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1087, 1148 (2002).
13. McClurg, supra note 9, at 1004 (citing Dempsey v. Nat'l Enquirer, 702 F. Supp. 927,
932-33 (D. Me. 1988)); see id. at 992 (stating that tort law "provides little protection from
intrusive . . . photography . . . so long as the activity occurs in a public place"). The lack of
protection for victims of upskirt photography can also be seen in the context of criminal laws.
See, e.g., Clay Calvert, Revisiting the Voyeurism Value in the First Amendment: From the
Sexually Sordid to the Details of Death, 27 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 721, 727-28 (2004) (noting that a
New York law criminalizing upskirt photography without any limitation on the victim's location
could fall to a constitutional challenge because "under common tort principles, one has no
expectation of privacy in a public place").
14. See infra Part II.B; see also Bill Rams, Cyber-Peeping: It's Growing, It's Frustrating, and
It's Legal-Trend: Officials Say There's Nothing They Can Do to Stop Men from Filming up
Skirts in Public Places, ORANGE COUNTY REG., June 26, 1998, at Al (describing how several men
were caught filming up women's skirts and down their blouses); Bill Rams, Prosecuting Up-Skirt
Videotaping May Be Uphill Battle-Crime: Another Man Is Acquitted of Similar Charges. The
Problems Is the Law Doesn't Address the Offense, ORANGE COUNTY REG., Aug. 27, 1998, at B2.
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Civil law must keep pace with technology and break away from
its current conception of privacy in public places. 15 Upskirt
photography will persist until the law provides a remedy that serves
as a sufficient deterrent against the behavior.16 Deterrence, though,
cannot be achieved when courts cling to conventional thinking that
invasions of privacy cannot occur in the public sphere.'7 New and
problematic forms of street photography necessitate a reexamination
of photographic invasions of privacy.' 8
Part II of this Note provides a brief history of the right to
privacy, highlights specific characteristics unique to photography that
intensify its threat to privacy, and introduces the conventional
rationales for denying individuals a right to privacy in public. Part III
surveys photographic invasion-of-privacy cases and examines the
classic rationales for upholding photographers' rights to shoot subjects
covertly in public. Drawing upon the concepts discussed in Part III,
Part IV then proposes that the tort of battery should be expanded to
encompass photographic street shootings. The tort of battery protects
an individual's dignity from intentional invasions. 19 Accordingly, the
interests at stake in street shootings fit squarely within the interests
battery seeks to preserve. Part IV further argues that the "contact"
requirement of battery can be satisfied either by actual contact
between the photographer and the victim (or the victim's clothing) or
15. An emerging body of scholarship recognizes the need for the law to recognize public
invasions of privacy. See, e.g., Blackman, supra note 6, at 354 (advocating creation of a right to
digital identity); Calvert & Brown, supra note 6, at 568 ("If the legal system is to value privacy in
the future, then it must be vigilant in updating existing laws and creating new ones-criminal,
civil, or both-that protect the very real privacy interests of individuals against people toting and
planting the latest video technologies in the most intrusive locations."); Kristin M. Beasley,
Comment, Up-Skirt and Other Dirt: Why Cell Phone Cameras and Other Technologies Require a
New Approach to Protecting Personal Privacy in Public Places, 31 S. ILL. U. L.J. 69, 92-93 (2006)
(arguing for application of definitions from criminal invasion of privacy laws to privacy torts);
Aimee Jodoi Lum, Comment, Don't Smile, Your Image Has Just Been Recorded on a Camera-
Phone: The Need for Privacy in the Public Sphere, 27 U. HAW. L. REV. 377, 411 (2005) (proposing
a new tort that recognizes privacy in public).
16. This Note focuses exclusively on the treatment of upskirt photography by civil law,
under which victims have no redress. However, it is also worth mentioning the potential
criminalization of upskirt photography. While some states have enacted criminal statutes meant
to address this problem, many states have not. In many states that have passed statutes, they
are largely ineffectual. See Beasley, supra note 15, at 92-93 (discussing the shortcomings of the
criminal system's approach to upskirt photography).
17. See infra Part II.B; see also Calvert, supra note 13, at 730 ("[I]f privacy concerns are
eventually to trump those of the voyeur, then it must be found that a person has a reasonable
expectation of privacy under her skirt.").
18. See Calvert & Brown, supra note 6, at 566 ("By now it should be abundantly clear that
developments in technology-in this case, miniature video recording devices and the Internet-
raise serious new concerns about privacy invasions.").
19. See infra note 181 and accompanying text.
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by a nontraditional theory of contact via light particles.
Characterizing street shootings as a form of battery eliminates many
of the impediments faced by plaintiffs in photographic invasion-of-
privacy claims.
II. THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND PHOTOGRAPHY
Although jurists have long recognized substantive rights to
privacy under the law, changing technologies have challenged
conventional understandings of these rights. Photography, in
particular, exacerbates invasions of privacy and thus poses a unique
challenge to privacy rights. Yet tort law has proved ineffectual at
protecting an individual's public right to privacy in photography cases.
A. The Origin of the Right to Privacy and the Special Problem of
Photography
Two of the earliest and most influential advocates for legal
protection of a right to privacy were Supreme Court Justice Louis D.
Brandeis and Professor Samuel Warren. 20 In 1890, they wrote their
seminal article, The Right to Privacy, which became the foundation for
privacy law in the United States.21 The article served in part as a
response to changes in photographic technology occurring at that
time. 22 Prior to 1884, cameras were large, expensive, and minimally
portable, and they required subjects to sit still for extended periods of
time to have their photograph taken. 23 In 1884, the Eastman Kodak
Company introduced the "snap camera," an inexpensive, handheld
camera that could take instantaneous photographs of people in
public.24 With the advent of this technology and the growing
popularity of print media,25 Warren and Brandeis feared that
surreptitiously taken photographs would threaten the "right to be let
20. See Benjamin E. Bratman, Brandeis and Warren's The Right to Privacy and the Birth of
the Right to Privacy, 69 TENN. L. REV. 623, 650 (2002) (noting that Warren and Brandeis's article
"get[s] the credit for spawning a mini-revolution in the law, a revolution that eventually spread
throughout the United States and throughout several fields of law to give us a wide-ranging
right to privacy").
21. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193
(1890).
22. DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN THE
INFORMATION AGE 57 (2004).
23. Id.
24. See id.
25. Id. In the late second half of the nineteenth century, newspapers grew dramatically in
popularity, with circulation increasing 1,000 percent from 1850 to 1890. Id. By 1890, there were
900 papers and over eight million readers. Id.
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alone" and observed that "[i]nstantaneous photographs ... invaded
the sacred precincts of private and domestic life."26 Recognizing this
threat, they constructed a "right to privacy" predicated on the need to
protect a person's "inviolate personality" from injury.27
In the aftermath of Warren and Brandeis's article, courts based
decisions involving photography on the right to privacy, which they
viewed as a "natural," "immutable," and "absolute" right.28 As one
court addressing a photographic invasion of privacy concluded:
[Tihe body of a person cannot be put on exhibition at any time or at any place without
his consent. The right of one to exhibit himself to the public at all proper times, in all
proper places, and in a proper manner is embraced within the right of personal
liberty.... [The use of a person's image without his consent makes him] under the
control of another [so] that he is no longer free, and that he is in reality a slave .... 29
Given the nature of photography, Warren and Brandeis's
concerns were well-voiced. Several characteristics unique to
photography make it likely to multiply the impact of invasions of
privacy. First, a photograph creates a permanent and unchanging
record of a subject, such that "[t]he temporal limitations that are
otherwise inherent in public intrusions are eliminated."30 In other
words, while nonphotographic invasions of privacy last only as long as
the victim is in public, photographs immortalize intrusions on
privacy.31 Second, because of a camera's ability to freeze images in
time, a photograph may also illuminate or reveal aspects of a scene
that otherwise would not be noticed by a casual observer. 32 Third,
when a photographer takes a picture, she gains ownership of her
subject's image, resulting in the subject's loss of control over display of
26. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 21, at 195-96.
27. Id. at 205.
28. See, e.g., Pasevich v. New Eng. Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68, 69-70 (Ga. 1905) ("Any person
whose intellect is in a normal condition recognizes at once that as to each individual member of
society there are matters private and there are matters public so far as the individual is
concerned. Each individual [will] instinctively resent any encroachment by the public upon his
rights which are of a private nature .... A right of privacy in matters purely private is therefore
derived from natural law.").
29. Id. at 63, 70.
30. McClurg, supra note 9, at 1041-42.
31. Id.
32. Id.; see also Greenspun, supra note 10 ("The best thing about street photography is that
it is possible for the final viewer of a print to see more than the original photographer.").
[Vol. 64:4:11311136
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her image. 33 When a subject's image leaves her control, she no longer
dictates when and how the public sees her.34
Fourth, because a camera replicates the scene before its lens,
photographs create a misconception of objectivity.35 As famous
photographer Ansel Adams once said, "Not everybody trusts paintings
but people believe photographs." Cameras are limited, though, in their
capacity to tell the whole truth. For example, the camera does not
capture the events immediately before and after a photograph is
taken; in this sense, the photograph removes an image from its
temporal context. Also, depending on the width of the lens or the
position of the cameraman, a photograph may not capture a subject's
entire surroundings, thereby misrepresenting the subject.
Finally, the negative impact on a person's psyche from an
unwanted reproduction of her image can be particularly severe.36
"Visual imagery can evoke powerful emotions and reactions that
render it distinct from (or simply unparalleled by) other forms of
expression."37 As one scholar described, the impact of a photograph is
"instantaneous, visceral, and intense."38 For all of these reasons, as
Warren and Brandeis recognized, the distinct nature of photography
militates in favor of paying special attention to photographic invasions
of privacy.
33. See Ysolde Gendreau, United States, in COPYRIGHT AND PHOTOGRAPHS 303, 303-05
(Ysolde Gendreau, Axel Nordemann & Rainer Oesch eds., 1999) (a photographer gains a property
right in his subject's image); McClurg, supra note 9, at 1041 (a photographer "take[s] a part of
the subject with him").
34. McClurg, supra note 9, at 1041. The negative implications of the transfer of control over
the subject's image from the subject to the photographer are even more pronounced because of
the Internet, which allows for widespread and unauthorized dissemination of a captured image.
See Jeffrey Rosen, Continental Divide, LEGAL AFF. 49, 53 (2004) (discussing the "unsettling
results" created by the Internet's capacity for exposition).
35. See Elaine Wang, Equal Protection in the World of Art and Obscenity: The Art
Photographer's Latent Struggle with Obscenity Standards in Contemporary America, 9 VAND. J.
ENT. & TECH. L. 113, 117 (2006) (discussing how the nature of photography as a multi-functional
medium that is perceived as capturing objective truth is more readily offensive to the viewer).
36. See Ysolde Gendreau, France, in COPYRIGHT AND PHOTOGRAPHS, supra note 33, at 131
("Because they can reproduce a person's physical traits, photographs are particularly likely to
infringe a person's privacy or publicity rights.").
37. Wang, supra note 35, at 117; see also Amy Adler, The Art of Censorship, 103 W. VA. L.
REV. 205, 213 (2000) (reasoning that "images are dangerous because of their irrational power,
their appeal to passion rather than reason").
38. VIcI GOLDBERG, THE POWER OF PHOTOGRAPHY: How PHOTOGRAPHS CHANGED OUR
LIVES 7 (1991).
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B. Current Civil-Law Remedies
Following Warren and Brandeis, Dean William Prosser
triggered the next major movement in American privacy law when he
identified four distinct privacy torts39 that were later adopted in the
Restatement (Second) of Torts.40 They included (1) unreasonable
intrusion upon the seclusion or solitude of another, (2) public
disclosure of private facts, (3) publicity that places another in a false
light, and (4) appropriation of another's name or likeness for personal
advantage. 41 These privacy torts are frequently used by plaintiffs
seeking redress for invasions of their right to privacy.
However, in most cases, these torts have proved ineffectual for
individuals who are photographed in public.42 Victims of street
photography generally bring claims for either unreasonable intrusion
upon the seclusion of another or public disclosure of private facts.43 In
order to establish a claim for intrusion upon the plaintiffs seclusion or
solitude, a plaintiff must show that the defendant (1) intentionally
intrudes into a private place or matter (2) as to which a plaintiff has a
reasonable expectation of privacy (3) in a manner objectionable to a
reasonable person.44 To recover under the tort of public disclosure of
private facts, a plaintiff must show that the defendant (1) gave
publicity to (2) a matter concerning plaintiffs private life (3) whose
publication would be "highly offensive to a reasonable person" and (4)
not of legitimate public concern.45 Both of these torts focus on
intrusions into an individual's private sphere. Unfortunately for
plaintiffs, courts uniformly have held that the sphere of privacy does
not extend to public places. This means that photographers may take
unauthorized photographs of people in public without legal
repercussions. 46
Dean Prosser offered several arguments supporting this spatial
delineation of the right to privacy. First, once an individual steps into
39. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383 (1960).
40. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652A-E (1977).
41. Id.
42. See Beasley, supra note 15, at 72-78 (explaining how Prosser's four privacy torts limit
recovery for invasions of privacy); see also McClurg, supra note 9, at 999 ("[A] review of court
decisions involving privacy claims raises doubts as to whether there really is a tort remedy for
invasion of privacy.").
43. See Beasley, supra note 15, at 72-78.
44. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977).
45. Id. § 652D.
46. See Note, Privacy, Photography, and the Press, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1086, 1089 (1998)
(discussing limited applicability of tort of intrusion).
[Vol. 64:4:11311138
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public, she no longer has a reasonable expectation of privacy. 47
Second, photographing in a public place does not constitute an
invasion of privacy "since this amounts to nothing more than making
a record, not differing essentially from a full written description, of a
public sight which any one present would be free to see."4 8
In addition, the First Amendment limits the tort of intrusion.49
Specifically, the First Amendment bars liability for the use of
photographs that are newsworthy or publicize matters of legitimate
public concern.50 As Dean Prosser explained, the protection of
newsworthy photographs "arises out of the desire and the right of the
public to know what is going on in the world, and the freedom of the
press and other agencies of information to tell them."51 Additionally,
photography that has an expressive purpose, such as artistic
photography, falls within the protection of the First Amendment.52
Therefore, even in cases where a court may find a legitimate invasion
of an individual's privacy, it must still balance the intrusion against
the constitutionally protected interest in free expression. 53
As discussed in the next Part, courts often employ Dean
Prosser's rationales to justify rulings adverse to the right to privacy
while placing little emphasis on the nature of the invasions felt by
targets of street photography. 54
47. Prosser, supra note 39, at 391-92; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B,
cmt. c (1977) (a photographer cannot be liable for taking another's photograph in a public place
"since [the subject] is not then in seclusion").
48. Prosser, supra note 39, at 391-92.
49. See id.
50. Battaglieri v. Mackinac Ctr. for Pub. Policy, 680 N.W.2d 915 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004)
(rejecting appropriation and false light claims of invasion of privacy brought by teachers union
and its president against advocacy group that mailed fundraising letters quoting union president
because the letter concerned matter of legitimate public concern privileging it under the First
Amendment and the group failed to show actual malice in mailing the letter).
51. Prosser, supra note 39, at 412.
52. See Bery v. City of New York, 97 F.3d 689 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that photography is a
protected activity); Baker v. City of New York, No. 01 CIV. 4888(NRB), 2002 WL 31132880, at *5
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2002) ("It is undisputed that [plaintiffs] street photography is First
Amendment expression[.]"); see also American Civil Liberties Union of Florida, Artistic Freedom,
available at http://www.aclufl.org/takeaction/download-resources/infopapers/14.cfm (last
visited May 10, 2010) ("Artistic creations, whatever their medium or message, and even if their
content is unpopular and of poor quality, are protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments
to the United States Constitution."). Without such protection, imagine all the forms of expression
that would have been chilled over the last century-Walker Evans's 1940s subway photographs,
Henri Cartier-Bresson's famous picture of the man with an umbrella jumping into a puddle, or
Lee Friedlander's photographs of strangers in New York City, to name a few.
53. For examples of this balancing, see infra Part III.
54. See, e.g., McNamara v. Freedom Newspapers, 802 S.W.2d 901, 903 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991)
(upholding the First Amendment in the face of an "offensive" invasion of privacy).
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III. JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF PHOTOGRAPHY CLAIMS
Courts face a variety of photographic invasion-of-privacy
claims. To illustrate the range of issues courts face, the cases analyzed
in this Part fall into four categories based on the nature of the
invasion felt by the plaintiff. Under the first category of cases, termed
"Accidental Celebrities,"55 the photographs in question do not reveal
anything private about the plaintiff. In such cases, plaintiffs object to
the mere fact of being photographed without consent. The second
category discusses cases in which photographers capture images of
plaintiffs in public venues engaging in private actions. The third
category of cases involves plaintiffs whose private parts are
unintentionally caught on film and published by defendants. Finally,
the fourth category presents upskirt cases, in which photographers
intentionally take pictures of private areas of females' bodies.
A. Accidental Celebrities: Nussenzweig v. DiCorcia
In Nussenzweig v. DiCorcia, photographer Philip-Lorca
DiCorcia conducted a two-year project on the streets of New York
City.5 6 He took candid photographs of passersby without obtaining
their consent.5 7 After gathering hundreds of photographs of random
people from the street, he selected images of seventeen individuals
who, unbeknownst to them, became the subjects of his photographic
collection "Heads."58 The collection debuted at the Pace Gallery in
Chelsea, a highly frequented Manhattan gallery.59
One of the photographs DiCorcia displayed depicted the image
of plaintiff Erno Nussenzweig, an Orthodox Hasidic Jew and retired
diamond merchant.60 In connection with the exhibit, Nussenzweig's
image appeared in catalogs, newspapers, and magazines. 61 Now,
Nussenzweig's image is immortalized on thousands of web pages and
55. The term "Accidental Celebrities" refers to the ability of a photograph to turn an
ordinary person into a celebrity against his will.
56. Nussenzweig v. DiCorcia, No. 108446/05, 2006 WL 304832, at *3-4 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb.
8, 2006). Phillip Lorca DiCorcia is a world renowned street photographer, known for his
juxtaposition of carefully planned staging and real-life subjects. His famous works include the
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archives. 62 Nussenzweig, a deeply religious man and a Holocaust
survivor, has a firmly rooted religious belief that the use of his picture
violates his religion's prohibition against graven images. 63 He sued
DiCorcia in the New York County Supreme Court under Civil Rights
Law sections 50 and 51, seeking both a permanent injunction to
prevent future use of his image and monetary damages for its prior
use. 64
The court weighed Nussenzweig's right to privacy against the
value of free speech. Relying on a series of New York court holdings
establishing "art" as constitutionally protected speech, the court held
that the right to free expression transcends an individual's right to
privacy. 65 The court did note, however, that the use of Nussenzweig's
photograph was "deeply and spiritually offensive" and the effect on
Nussenzweig was "distress [ing]."66 In a broader context, it commented
that First Amendment protections have been upheld "even in the face
of a deeply offensive use of someone's likeness."67 It further stated that
"constitutional exceptions to privacy will be upheld, notwithstanding
that the speech or art may have unintended devastating consequences
on the subject, or may even be repugnant."68 Such consequences are
"the price that every person must be prepared to pay for in a society in
which information and opinion flow freely."6 9 Cases like Nussenzweig
62. See, e.g., Philip Gefter, The Theater of the Street, the Subject of the Photograph, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 19, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/19/arts/design/19phot.
html? r=1&scp=l&sq=nussenzweig&st=cse (last visited May 10, 2010); Wikipedia,
File:Dicorcia.jpg, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/index.html?curid=4962634 (last visited May 10,
2010). DiCorcia also created ten edition proofs and three artist's proofs of the Nussenzweig
photograph. Nussenzweig, 2006 WL 304832, at *3-4. The gross sale of these prints earned
DiCorcia in the neighborhood of $20,000 to $30,000 each. Id.
63. Nussenzweig is a member of the Klausenber Sect of Orthodox Hasidic Judaism, a sect
that was almost completely eliminated during the Holocaust. Nussenzweig, 2006 WL 304832, at
*4. According to his religion, DiCorcia's use of his image violates the second commandment
(Exod. 20:3-5; Deut. 5:7-9), which reads: "Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven image, or
any likeness of any thing that is in heaven above, or that is in the earth beneath, or that is in the
water under the earth." Id.
64. Nussenzweig, 2006 WL 304832, at *4. Section 50 creates a right to privacy, under which
a person may not use "for advertising purposes, or for the purposes of trade," a picture of a
person without first obtaining consent. N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 50 (Consol. 2008). Section 51
allows equitable actions and damages for violations of an individual's right to privacy. Id. § 51.
65. Nussenzweig, 2006 WL 304832, at *6-7 (citing Hoepker v. Kruger, 200 F. Supp. 2d 340,
350 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (observing that New York courts have taken the position that "art is speech,
and, accordingly, that art is entitled to First Amendment protection vis-a-vis the right of
privacy"), and Simeonov v. Tiegs, 602 N.Y.S.2d 1014, 1018 (Civ. Ct. 1993) ("[Wlorks of art ...
convey ideas, just as do literature, movies or theater.")).
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reflect a judicial commitment to protect photography as a form of free
speech, even in the face of an egregious invasion of privacy.
B. Private Acts in Public: Gill v. Hearst Publishing Co.
Gill v. Hearst Publishing Co. involved a photograph that
depicted a couple romantically embracing at a farmer's market. 70 The
photograph was published in an issue of Harper's Bazaar in an article
on the topic of love.71 Plaintiffs sued for damages claiming an invasion
of their right to privacy. 72 The Supreme Court of California held that
publication of the photograph did not invade the couple's right to
privacy because "[b]y their own voluntary action plaintiffs waived [this
right]."73 In other words, because they willingly embraced in an
environment where others could see them, they assumed the risk of
being photographed. The court further reasoned that an individual
cannot have an expectation of privacy in public. 74
Justice Carter "most emphatically" dissented from the majority
holding.75 He found "no basis for the conclusion that the second a
person leaves the portals of his home he consents to have his
photograph taken under all circumstances thereafter."76 He argued
that the photograph had no independent news value.77 Additionally,
he claimed, "By plaintiffs' doing what they did in view of a tiny
fraction of the public, does not mean that they consented to
observation by the millions of readers of the defendant's magazine."78
Under the majority's logic, a photographer could take a picture of an
individual's unintentionally exposed naked body and disseminate it
without fear of liability.79
C. The Original Upskirt Cases: Daily Times Democrat v. Graham and
McNamara v. Freedom Newspapers
Even before the surge of upskirt photography, courts were
confronted with unauthorized photographs that unveiled private areas
70. 40 Cal. 2d 224, 226 (1953).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 230.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 234.
76. Id. at 233.
77. Id. at 232.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 233.
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of victims' bodies. As this Section shows, there are competing notions
about how to resolve such cases.
In 1964, the Alabama Supreme Court decided Daily Times
Democrat v. Graham, in which the plaintiff sued for invasion of
privacy when a newspaper published a picture of her at a county
fair.80 The photograph, taken after the wind blew up her skirt,
revealed her undergarments.8 1 Even though the photograph was taken
in public, the court held that the publication of the picture constituted
an invasion of the plaintiffs right to privacy. 82 The court did
acknowledge that, under some circumstances, privacy rights must
yield to the public interest in being informed.83 However, the court
distinguished this claim by noting that the photograph of the plaintiff
was not newsworthy and thus not entitled to First Amendment
protection. 84
The court also rejected the argument that an individual has no
right to privacy in public, reasoning that such a principle should not
be applied when its application leads to illogical results.85 Here, the
photograph was "embarrassing to one of normal sensibilities, . . .
'offensive to modesty and decency,' " and depicted "something which
delicacy, purity, or decency forbid to be expressed."86 The court
therefore concluded that "[t]o hold that one who is involuntarily and
instantaneously enmeshed in an embarrassing pose forfeits her right
to privacy merely because she happened at the moment to be part of a
public scene would be illogical, wrong, and unjust."8 7
When courts determine that photographs are newsworthy,
however, they have reached different results.88 In McNamara v.
Freedom Newspapers, decided in 1991, the Texas Court of Appeals
addressed a newspaper's publication of a photograph depicting a high-
school soccer player running after a ball with his private parts
inadvertently exposed.89 McNamara sued for invasion of privacy under
Texas law, which recognizes a cause of action for public disclosure of
embarrassing private facts about a plaintiff.90 The court held that the
80. 162 So. 2d 474, 478 (Ala. 1964).
81. Id. at 476.
82. Id. at 478.
83. Id. at 477.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 478.
86. Id. at 477.
87. Id.
88. See, e.g., McNamara v. Freedom Newspapers, 802 S.W.2d 901, 903 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991).
89. Id.
90. Id. at 903 n.2.
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publication accurately depicted a public, newsworthy event, and
therefore the First Amendment insulated the newspaper from liability
for invading McNamara's privacy.9' In effect, the court established a
rule that the First Amendment trumps the right to privacy when an
individual is photographed for a newsworthy publication. 92 It reasoned
that " '[t]he risk of this exposure is an essential incident of life in a
society which places a primary value on freedom of speech and of
press.' "93 Reflective of the value placed on the freedoms of speech and
of the press, courts must uphold First Amendment rights "even
though [the result is] offensive to ordinary sensibilities."94
As both Daily Times Democrat and McNamara demonstrate,
the First Amendment sets an outer limit on plaintiffs' ability to
recover for invasions of privacy when the published image is deemed
to be newsworthy and of public interest. Any approach designed to
strengthen the rights of photographed victims will have to incorporate
such First Amendment limits.
D. Upskirt Cases: State v. Glas
In State v. Glas, the Washington Supreme Court addressed the
appeals of two separate defendants, both of whom were found guilty of
criminal upskirt voyeurism.95 The first defendant, Glas, was
discovered lurking in the ladies' department at a department store.96
On two separate occasions, female employees noticed him squatting on
the floor beside them, camera in hand.97 When the police later
confiscated his film, it revealed pictures of their undergarments. 98 The
other defendant, Sorrells, was caught with a video camera at a public
food festival in Seattle. 99 His film revealed images taken at ground
level up the skirts of both young girls and women.100
Glas and Sorrels were both tried under Washington's
voyeurism statute, which makes it a crime to photograph another
91. Id. at 905.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 904 (quoting Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 388 (1967)).
94. Id.
95. 54 P.3d 147, 154 (Wash. 2002). While this Note focuses on the civil treatment of
photographic invasions of privacy, Glas-a criminal case-has been included because the court's
analysis provides the best example of the dangers of applying the traditional "no reasonable
expectation of privacy in public rationale" to the unique genre of upskirt cases.







person for the purpose of "arousing or gratifying . .. sexual desire ...
while the person . . . is in a place where he or she would have a
reasonable expectation of privacy."01 The statute defines a place where
a person "would have a reasonable expectation of privacy" as either
"[a] place where a reasonable person would believe that he or she
could disrobe in privacy, without being concerned that his or her
undressing was being photographed or filmed by another;" or "[a]
place where one may reasonably expect to be safe from casual or
hostile intrusion or surveillance." 10 2
Despite the broad wording of the statute, the court held that it
did not reach the defendants' conduct. The court explained that casual
intrusions occur frequently in public and, "[t]herefore, public places
could not logically constitute locations where a person could
reasonably expect to be safe from casual or hostile intrusion or
surveillance."103 Although the defendants "engaged in disgusting and
reprehensible behavior," the court held that the voyeurism statute did
not cover intrusions of privacy in public places and therefore did not
prohibit upskirt photography in public locations.104
E. Common Trends
The cases described above highlight courts' trouble in applying
traditional rules and doctrine to the ever-changing field of
photography. When viewed as a whole, though, they present trends
that reflect the values courts find important. This Section lists those
trends and analyses their merits.
1. Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
Courts often conclude that an individual loses her reasonable
expectation of privacy when she enters the public arena.105 This
101. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.44.115(2) (2003) (emphasis added). Washington's voyeurism
statute is modeled after the Video Voyeurism Prevention Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1801 (2000). The Act
makes it a crime to photograph the private areas of an individual on federal land without her
consent "under circumstances in which [she] has a reasonable expectation of privacy." Id.
102. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.44.115(1)(c)(i)-(ii).
103. Glas, 54 P.3d at 150.
104. Id. at 154. Other courts have reached different outcomes, see State v. Morris, 644
N.W.2d 114, 118 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002), but it is not the majority approach. Under civil law, as
one scholar put it, victims of upskirt photography can "emphatically not" have an expectation of
privacy in a public place. CLAY CALVERT, VOYEUR NATION: MEDIA, PRIVACY, AND PEERING IN
MODERN CULTURE 202 (2000) ("Can a person have an expectation of privacy in a public place?
Unfortunately for some of the victims of upskirt voyeurism, the answer under civil law initially
appears to be an emphatic no.").
105. See supra Part III.
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conclusion is misplaced. The conventional understanding of privacy,
comparative perspectives on the right to one's image, and ingrained
social norms all suggest that "expectation of privacy" should not be
defined in spatial terms. 106
The conventional understanding of privacy does not distinguish
between public and private spheres.107 A widely accepted definition of
privacy, set forth by Professor Alan Westin, 08 reads, "Privacy is the
claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to determine for
themselves when, how, and to what extent information about them is
communicated to others."109 While no one enjoys the absolute privacy
that Westin describes, if an individual lost her reasonable expectation
of privacy upon entering the public sphere, it would render this
definition meaningless. When a person steps outside the four walls of
her home, she still expects to control what personal "information" gets
conveyed to the public.110 To provide a basic example, garment choices
dictate how much the world sees of a person's body.' Such control
over one's body is essential to one's privacy."2 As the Supreme Court
asserted in 1891, "No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully
guarded by the common law, than the right of every individual to the
possession and control of his own person."11 3
Once a photographer captures a subject on film, the
photographer controls how the subject's image "is communicated to
others." In Nussenzweig, for example, the photographer made the
decision to display Nussenzweig's image at the art gallery and in
advertisements for his exhibition. As a direct result of this initial
"communication," the photograph reached the Internet and control
over Nussenzweig's likeness became even more dispersed. Now,
106. McClurg, supra note 9, at 1028-29.
107. Id. at 1029.
108. See Oscar H. Gandy, Jr., Legitimate Business Interest: No End in Sight? An Inquiry into
the Status of Privacy in Cyberspace, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 77, 117 (calling Professor Westin's
definition "the most well known definition of information privacy").
109. AIAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967); see also Ruth Gavison, Privacy and
the Limits of Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421 (1980) (providing a variety of definitions of "privacy"); Gowri
Ramachandran, Freedom of Dress: State and Private Regulation of Clothing, Hairstyle, Jewelry,
Makeup, Tattoos, and Piercing, 66 MD. L. REV. 11, 34 (2006) ("[W]e cannot deny that in the
current social context, some right of privacy is implicated when one loses personal control over
whether one's own body is exposed. We cannot be forced to uncover . .. ourselves against our
will.").
110. ERVING GOFFMAN, RELATIONS IN PUBLIC: MICROSTUDIES OF THE PUBLIC ORDER 1-5
(1971).
111. For example, in certain cultures, women wear burqas to cover their heads, faces, and
bodies.
112. Solove, supra note 12, at 1135.
113. Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891).
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anyone with access to a computer can control where and to whom the
image goes. Nussenzweig lost the ability to "determine for [himself]
when, how, and to what extent information about [him was]
communicated to others." 114
Global perspectives on the relationship between control of a
person's body and use of her image demonstrate the divergence of
American jurisprudence on the centrality of one's likeness to one's
privacy. In France, an individual has a property right in his image
that is viewed as an "extension of the rights that [he] has over his
body, of which the image is a visual representation."" 5 In some
African cultures, one's image is considered an extension of one's soul.
For example, "[1]aws against photographing the Masai tribe in East
Africa stem from the tribe's traditional belief that cameras capture
their souls."" 6 The cultural emphasis on control over one's image in
other countries suggests the important nature of the right at issue in
these cases. By disallowing recovery for photographic invasions of
privacy that occur in public, U.S. courts contravene a person's widely
recognized right "to the possession and control over his own person."117
In summary, courts' traditional conclusion that an individual cannot
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in public is misguided.
In upskirt cases, a female has a reasonable expectation of
privacy underneath her skirt, regardless of her physical location. The
fact that she has made the conscious decision to wear clothing that
covers certain parts of her body supports this conclusion. When an
upskirt photographer takes a picture, the photographer, not the
subject, dictates the way private information about the subject is
communicated to others. Thus, the subject loses control over the
exhibition of her body. Distinguishing between public and private
physical spaces does not work in the context of upskirt photography.
2. Assumption of Risk
Courts also deny relief to plaintiffs in privacy cases by
reasoning that when a person appears in public, she assumes the risk
that she will be seen and possibly photographed by others." 8 The
114. WESTIN, supra note 109, at 7.
115. Helen Trouille, Private Life and Public Image: Privacy Legislation in France, 49 INT'L &
CoMP. L.Q. 199, 204 (2000).
116. John Flinn, Picture Imperfect; Masai, Tourists Set Dignity Aside to Capture Kodak
Moments, FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, June 21, 1998, at 7.
117. In part this departure from the international norm reflects the comparative value this
country places on freedom of expression.
118. McClurg, supra note 9, at 1038.
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argument that individuals assume the risk of being photographed
when they enter public also misses the mark. According to Professor
Andrew McClurg, "assumption of risk is grounded in the notion of
consent."119 The concept of assumption of risk, which has its roots in
negligence law, is predicated on the notion that the plaintiff has
consented to relieve the defendant of his obligation to exercise
reasonable care. 120 To consent, an individual must be aware of the risk
and voluntarily choose to assume it.121 Put differently, consent is a
conscious and intentional act.
Plaintiffs in Gill, Daily Times Democrat, and Nussenzweig did
not have "full knowledge of the risk" of being photographed and thus
cannot have assumed it.12 2 While one could argue that they assumed
the risk by stepping out of their homes, such reasoning leads to absurd
results. 123 Professor McClurg highlights this absurdity by applying the
theory to negligence law: "[I]t cannot be said that a pedestrian
assumes the risk of being hit by a negligent driver simply because he
knows such an event is possible." 124 Furthermore, in cases like Gill,
Nussenzweig, and Daily Times Democrat, even if the plaintiffs
somehow consciously assumed the risk of being photographed, it
seems even more unlikely that they assumed the risk of publication
and distribution of their images. 125
While Professor McClurg's argument is well taken, the
assumption-of-risk rationale cannot be dismissed entirely. Assumption
of risk operates on a sliding scale. Consider a situation in which the
plaintiff clearly assumed the risk of being photographed. In
McNamara, for example, the plaintiff competed in a well-attended
soccer game. He knew that spectators would be watching, and it was
reasonable for him to expect photographers at the event. Thus, by
playing in the game, he assumed the risk of being photographed. 12 6
This case falls at one end of the spectrum.
Now consider the other end of the spectrum. In Nussenzweig,
the plaintiff was walking down the street, literally doing nothing but




123. Id. at 1040.
124. Id.
125. See id. at 1039-40 ("[The court's analysis [in Gill] was flawed for failing to distinguish
between merely voluntarily appearing in a public place and voluntarily consenting to be stared
at, photographed, and publicized.").
126. See also Cohen v. Marx, 211 P.2d 320, 321 (Cal. Ct. App. 1949) (prize fighter could not
"hold others liable for commenting upon the acts which had taken place when he had voluntarily
exposed himself to the public eye").
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walking. Even though he was in public, the very fact that he was
among others could be said to have created an expectation of
privacy. 127 In public, and especially on the crowded city street, he
blended in. 128 He did not waive his right to privacy 29 because he never
intended to remove his "cloak of anonymity." 30
The same is true for upskirt photography. In those cases, the
victim cannot reasonably be said to have assumed any risk of being
photographed in such a manner. When they are in public, victims of
upskirt photographers generally do not draw attention to themselves.
Indeed, the fact that they are mixed into a crowd and not being
watched by others is what makes them attractive targets. Upskirt
victims also fall at the minimal assumption-of-risk end of the
spectrum.
Gill falls in the middle of this spectrum. The photograph in Gill
depicted a couple in an amorous embrace. The court reasoned that
"[b]y their own voluntary action plaintiffs waived [the right to
privacy]."131 The choice of the word "action" implies that the couple
affirmatively did something to give up their right to privacy: they
acted in a way that drew attention to themselves. Viewed in this
context, Gill starts to look more like the conscious waiver in
McNamara.
3. The Public-Record Argument
The McNamara court's reasoning-that street photography
cannot constitute an invasion of privacy because it merely records
something already seen by the public-lacks merit. 132 Camera lenses
both magnify and freeze an image, thereby drawing attention to
aspects of a scene that might not be observable to the naked eye. 133
McNamara exemplifies the perverse implications of this feature of
photography.13 4 The plaintiff in McNamara was playing soccer in a
127. See Blackman, supra note 6, at 325.
128. Id.
129. Cf. Barnhart v. Paisano Publ'ns, LLC, 457 F. Supp. 2d 590, 592 (D. Md. 2006) (woman
lifted up her shirt at a motorcycle convention).
130. Blackman, supra note 6, at 325; see Gavison, supra 109, at 428 (conceptualizing privacy
as a product of anonymity).
131. Gill v. Hearst Publ'g Co., 40 Cal. 2d 224, 230 (1953).
132. See 802 S.W.2d 901, 903 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991) (focusing on the fact that the photograph
in question accurately depicted a public event).
133. McClurg, supra note 9, at 1042.
134. See also Jarrett v. Butts, 379 S.E.2d 583, 585 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989) (rejecting plaintiffs
invasion of privacy claim when a fourteen-year-old girl was required by her teacher to assume
2010]1 1149
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
stadium. Because he was moving and the spectators were watching
from a distance, his exposed genitalia would have gone unnoticed but
for the click of a camera.
Moreover, this reasoning ignores the secondary invasion of
privacy inherent in photography. Even if the act of taking the
photograph is no more invasive than an observation by the naked eye,
subsequent dissemination exceeds the scope of an invasion that could
occur on the street absent a camera.135 A photograph allows the
photographer to distribute the image to a much larger audience than
would be present at the time it is taken.136 Consistent with this
enlarged scope, a distributed photograph will reach a wider variety of
audiences than the subject initially intends.137 Thus, photographs can
significantly multiply original invasions of privacy.
Upskirt photography also helps to reveal the inherent
weakness in the public-record argument. Cameras used to capture
upskirt victims are usually sufficiently small and maneuverable that
photographers can take pictures from angles and in proximities that
observation by the naked eye might prohibit. Coupled with the
magnification potential of lenses, these cameras can record images
that the naked eye would never see.138 An upskirt photograph is not a
record of "a public sight which any one would be free to see." 3 9
4. The First Amendment
When confronted with photographic invasions of privacy, courts
face the critical dilemma of how to balance a plaintiffs privacy right
with the First Amendment. The First Amendment provides perhaps
the most compelling reason to uphold the photographer's right to take
unauthorized photographs in public. Courts uphold First Amendment
rights even in offensive invasions of privacy. Cases like Daily Times
Democrat, Gill, Nussenzweig, and McNamara suggest that if the First
Amendment applies, it automatically trumps the plaintiffs' right to
privacy. 140 Accordingly, the courts focused their inquiries on whether
various poses, including sitting in a chair with her legs open, on the ground that the photographs
did not reveal any aspect of her person that was not readily visible to the other students).
135. See McClurg, supra note 9, at 1043 (finding a "large difference between merely
observing a person and photographing the person").
136. Id. at 1042.
137. Id. at 1043.
138. See Calvert & Brown, supra note 6, at 471 ("dime-sized spy cameras" and "high-powered
lenses" make "recording others' private activities both easier to capture and harder to detect").
139. Prosser, supra note 39, at 391-92.
140. Daily Times Democrat v. Graham, 162 So. 2d 474, 478 (Ala. 1964); Gill v. Hearst Publ'g
Co., 40 Cal. 2d 224, 230 (1953); Nussenzweig v. DiCorcia, No. 108446/05, 2006 WL 304832, at *8
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the First Amendment applied.141 In Nussenzweig, the court asked
whether the photographs constituted "art" and thus fell within the
ambit of First Amendment protection.142 Once the court determined
that the photographs merited protection as art, it ended its inquiry
without further consideration of their effect on Nussenzweig.143
Similarly, in Gill, the court justified the outcome on the basis that the
photograph had entertainment value and thus fell within the bounds
of free expression. 144 In McNamara, the court asked whether the
photograph accurately depicted a public, newsworthy event. 145 Upon
the determination that it did, the court stopped there.14 6 While the
court reached a different outcome in Daily Times Democrat, it based
its decision on the photograph not being newsworthy.
Courts have acknowledged the negative implications that the
First Amendment may have for individuals' privacy rights. In
McNamara, the court noted that the First Amendment controls even
though it produces results that are "offensive to ordinary
sensibilities."147 Similarly, the Nussenzweig court remarked that the
First Amendment controls "even in the face of a deeply offensive use of
someone's likeness" and even when it "may have unintended
devastating consequences on the subject, or may even be
repugnant."148
The recognition that certain forms of speech are outside the
purview of the First Amendment lends support to the argument that
certain forms of photographic speech should not be indiscriminately
protected. For example, obscenity, libel, and slander are not protected
by the First Amendment.149 Likewise, the obscene and injurious
nature of upskirt photographs suggest that they are not worthy of
blanket protection under the First Amendment.
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 8, 2006) (courts uniformly uphold First Amendment protection in right to
privacy cases); McNamara v. Freedom Newspapers, Inc., 802 S.W.2d 901, 905 (Tex. App. 1991) (if
the First Amendment applies it provides the defendant with immunity from liability).
141. Daily Times Democrat, 162 So. 2d at 478; Gill, 40 Cal. 2d at 230; Nussenzweig, 2006 WL
304832, at *8; McNamara, 802 S.W.2d at 905.
142. 2006 WL 304832, at *7. The threshold state action requirement of the First Amendment
is satisfied in Nussenzweig because the plaintiff sued the defendants under New York state tort
law. See id. at 5. State laws cannot infringe upon the First Amendment and thus, the defendant
has a First Amendment defense.
143. Id.
144. Gill, 40 Cal. 2d at 229.
145. 802 S.W.2d at 905.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 904.
148. Nussenzweig, 2006 WL 304832, at *8.
149. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (obscenity); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250
(1952) (libel and slander).
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Furthermore, while protection of valid forms of expression
should not be diminished, inadequate protection of privacy may
ultimately thwart the interests protected by the First Amendment.
Inadequate protection may create a situation where individuals are
reluctant to put themselves and their ideas forward due to the threat
of unchecked ridicule and harassment. As Professor Josh Blackman
persuasively argues, individual expression flows most freely when a
person knows she has some degree of privacy.SO Conversely, if a
person feels she is being watched, she is more likely to monitor her
behavior.15 1 Taking this proposition one step further, if an individual
knows she is being recorded, she may be more reserved or "camera
shy."152 Protection of privacy goes hand-in-hand with protection of
First Amendment freedoms.153 An improper balance between the two
interests yields a suboptimal level of discourse in society, working
against the values the First Amendment is designed to protect. 154
Professor Blackman illustrates the importance of privacy to the
First Amendment (and vice versa) by looking at two extreme
situations. 155 First, he considers a world with no privacy protections
and unrestricted free speech. 15 6 Such a place, he contends, would stifle
free expression because individuals would not express themselves "for
fear of embarrassment, ridicule, humiliation, or retribution." 5 7
Second, he considers a world with maximum privacy protection and no
free speech.158 This situation would also chill freedom of expression
because individuals would not be able to express their true opinions.159
To achieve an "optimal level of expression," an individual's right to
privacy must be sufficiently protected but not overprotected. 6 0
Although the First Amendment value of upskirt photography
might not be readily apparent, some have suggested upskirt
150. Blackman, supra note 6, at 326-27.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. See id. at 326 ("Privacy and free speech can be thought of as two sides of the same
coin."); Sean M. Scott, The Hidden First Amendment Values of Privacy, 71 WASH. L. REV. 683,
723 (1996) ("[Tlhe right to privacy and the First Amendment both serve the same interest in
individual autonomy.").
154. See Blackman, supra note 6, at 326-27 ("When properly balanced, [privacy and speech]
yield optimal results.").





160. Id. ("[P]rivacy and free speech complement one another when properly balanced to
provide a symmetry to optimize people's desire to express themselves, and at the same time,
minimizes any apprehension that such an expression may cause.").
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photography warrants constitutional protection merely due to its
status as photography. 161 In fact, some courts have suggested that
upskirt photographs are constitutionally protected forms of speech. 162
This notion is not an isolated one; courts consistently have upheld
photographers' rights on First Amendment grounds, even when the
photograph at issue has questionable First Amendment value.
In the upskirt context, however, overprotection of injurious
speech through the First Amendment can produce unsettling results.
To illustrate the potential application of the First Amendment to
upskirt photographs, consider a variation on Nussenzweig. Instead of
positioning his camera on scaffolding, assume that the photographer
placed a small camera in street grating below his subjects and took
pictures up their skirts as they walked by. Assume further that the
photographer collected the photographs and displayed them in an art
gallery. 163 Setting obscenity standards aside as beyond the scope of
this Note, the photographer's collection would presumably fall within
the protection of the First Amendment. As McNamara showed, the
fact that a photograph exposes its subject's intimate areas does not
carry much weight if the photograph falls within the scope of the First
Amendment.
But the use of the First Amendment to defeat privacy claims
for upskirt photography is more troubling than in McNamara for
several reasons. First, the act of obtaining an upskirt photograph is
bothersome. As opposed to a traditional photograph, which generally
is taken from a distance, an upskirt photographer must interject
himself into his subject's personal space.164 Second, in cases like
McNamara, the photographer did not intend to capture his subjects'
anatomy on film. In contrast, the sole purpose of upskirt photographs
is to reveal intimate parts of subjects' bodies.165 Allowing the First
161. CALVERT, supra note 104, at 214 (finding a "voyeurism value of free expression");
Calvert, supra note 13, at 730 (a camera "involves images and thereby raises freedom of
expression concerns").
162. See State v. Stevenson, 114 P.3d 699, 704 n.7, 707 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005) (finding
defendant guilty of the crime of voyeurism and distinguishing State v. Glas, 54 P.3d 147, 154
(Wash. 2002), on the grounds that "photography may be considered a medium of speech").
163. This hypothetical is not that far-fetched. In fact, one artist-Richard Kern-assembled
a collection of twenty-five upskirt photographs, which he took on the New York City subways of
willing participants, and showcased them in a Manhattan art gallery. Tracy Clark-Flory, Porn in
a Flash: A Troubling Surge in Creepy "Upskirt" Photography Has Lawmakers in a Twist - And
Body Parts of Women Posted all over the Internet, SALON.COM, Nov. 25, 2008,
http://www.salon.com/mwt/feature/2008/11/25/upskirting/index.html.
164. For example, the defendant in Glas took photographs while squatting on the floor just a
few feet behind his subjects. 54 P.3d at 149.
165. Clark-Flory, supra note 163.
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Amendment to encompass upskirt photography would greatly
undercut privacy rights.
If courts allow upskirt photographs to be taken without
remedy, they will inadequately protect societal values on individual
human dignity. Society has taken great strides to hide certain aspects
of life.166 For example, people dress to cover up their naked bodies.167
This ingrained social practice reflects a desire to keep certain aspects
of an individual's life restricted to the private sphere regardless of the
individual's physical location.168 When an individual's intimate areas
are photographed for others to see, it creates "severe and sometimes
debilitating humiliation and loss of self-esteem."16 9 As such, "[t]he fact
that the exposure occurred in a public place should [be] treated as
relatively unimportant."170
IV. STREET SHOOTINGS As BATTERY
This Part proposes that victims of street shootings should be
able to obtain relief under the tort doctrine of battery. It first analyses
several themes that reveal shortcomings with the current doctrinal
approach.
After scrutinizing courts' reasoning in photographic invasion-
of-privacy cases, several themes emerge. First, courts frequently rule
against plaintiffs who suffer legitimate photographic invasions of
privacy under the justification that an individual does not have a right
to privacy in public. Recognizing the problem with this rationale,
Professor McClurg has proposed an expansion of the tort of intrusion
to encompass public invasions of privacy. 171 Specifically, he argues for
a new definition of the tort of intrusion that explicitly states that an
individual can have a cause of action for an intrusion that occurs in a
public place.172 He also suggests seven factors that should be
considered in evaluating the offensiveness of the intrusive conduct: (1)
the defendant's motive, (2) the scope of the intrusion, (3) the physical
location of the plaintiff at the time of the intrusion, (4) whether the
defendant asked for plaintiffs consent, (5) whether the plaintiff took
any actions to suggest she wanted privacy, (6) whether the defendant
disseminated information concerning the plaintiff that was obtained





171. See McClurg, supra note 9, at 1055-66.
172. Id. at 1088.
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during the intrusion, and (7) whether the subject of the intrusion is a
matter of legitimate public concern.173 The rise of upskirt photography
since McClurg proposed this expansion provides further support for
his conclusion that traditional notions of privacy should be redefined
to encompass invasions that occur in public.
Second, victims of photographic invasions-of-privacy cases do
not lack a cause of action. In several of the cases examined in Part III,
plaintiffs had viable tort claims but were unable to recover because,
after balancing the competing interests, courts found that plaintiffs'
privacy rights did not outweigh the societal interest in protecting
freedom of expression. 174 This result suggests a potential shortcoming
of Professor McClurg's seven-factor balancing approach: courts are
already weighing these considerations. Thus, to the extent that
outcomes in photographic invasion-of-privacy cases are troubling, it is
unclear that they would come out differently under a balancing test.
Third, the recent surge of upskirt photography highlights the
danger of overextending traditional rationales for denying right-to-
privacy claims. Even when they are in public places, individuals have
a reasonable expectation of privacy beneath their skirts. Moreover,
upskirt victims generally do not assume the risk of being
photographed, and they certainly do not assume the risk of being
photographed in the invasive manner of upskirt photography. Upskirt
photographs reveal anatomical areas that have been intentionally
covered and that would not be observable by others but for the
photograph. In upskirt cases, photographers affirmatively intend to
invade their subjects' privacy. Other forms of street photography lack
this element. Additionally, and perhaps most critically, if future courts
find First Amendment value in upskirt photographs, the practice
would be permanently protected from the reach of both civil and
criminal law.175
Fourth, the line between objectionable photographs and
photographs that deserve protection even when the outcomes may be
"offensive"176 may be blurry. In formulating a legal response to upskirt
street shootings, the challenge is to develop a practical treatment that
discourages burgeoning photographic invasions of privacy without
unduly chilling the forms of street photography that have legitimate
First Amendment value.
173. Id. at 1057-58.
174. See supra Part IV.
175. See, e.g., State v. Stevenson, 114 P.3d 699, 704 n.7, 707 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005) (noting
that upskirt photographs are a form of expression).




If, as this Part argues, the tort of battery is broad enough to
encompass street shootings, victims may have a source of civil redress
that accounts for these considerations. A defendant may be liable for
battery regardless of where he acts. Thus, the fact that a street
shooter captured his victim in public would not prohibit recovery.
Moreover, a victim could recover for an invasion of her privacy under
battery without impinging on a photographer's First Amendment
rights. Because the act of taking a photograph would be actionable in
and of itself, any First Amendment value in a resulting photograph
would still be preserved. While the First Amendment could still serve
as a defense against a battery claim, characterizing street shootings as
battery might mitigate the problems that result when privacy rights
are pitted against the right to freedom of expression. Specifically,
instead of balancing the right to privacy against the First
Amendment, upskirt claims could be based in deeply rooted common
law notions of battery.177
Battery is defined as "a harmful or offensive contact with a
person, resulting from an act intended to cause the plaintiff or a third
person to suffer such a contact, or apprehension that such a contact is
imminent."178 The purpose behind the tort of battery is to safeguard a
"plaintiffs interest in protection of his or her bodily well-being and
dignity from intentional invasion."179 In upskirt photography, the
displacement of an individual's naked self from the private sphere to
the public one offends human dignity. 1s0 Additionally, the actual act of
shooting an upskirt photograph bears similarity to conduct the tort of
battery seeks to deter. The upskirt photographer gains access to a
private area of his victim's body by an intentional and contemptible
act. While the photograph may not expose the individual at the time
the photograph is taken, any subsequent viewing creates the same
result.
One could argue, as Dean Prosser might, that upskirt
photography cannot fall within the purview of battery because it does
177. See Ramachandran, supra note 109, at 35 (discussing the importance of public
presentation of the physical body and describing claims for battery as deeply-rooted); see also id.
at 37 ("Regardless of the private or public nature of the context we are in, certain rights to bodily
integrity and privacy are generally protected by state criminal law and the common-law torts of
battery and assault. The sense that other persons should not, except in unusual circumstances,
intrude on what we do with our own bodies is quite strong, even in the private context.").
178. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 9, at 39 (5th ed.
1984).
179. KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE FORMS AND FUNCTIONS OF TORT LAW 22 (1997).
180. See Bloustein, supra note 11, at 973-74 (discussing the fundamental desire for privacy
with respect to one's body).
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not satisfy the "contact" requirement.181 This argument fails, though,
for at least three reasons. First, a battery can exist without actual
physical contact. The essence of a battery claim lies in the "offense to
the dignity involved in the unpermitted and intentional invasion of
the inviolability of his person and not in any physical harm done to his
body."182 As such, courts have long held that a battery can be
established without actual physical contact. 183 To capture an upskirt
photograph, a photographer must get reasonably close to his victim
and will often brush up against his victim's skin or clothing. 184
Moreover, courts have held that certain types of "invasions of one's
personal space" are as offensive as actual contact with the body.185
Second, courts have allowed recovery under the tort of battery
in particularly offensive cases, even where traditional physical contact
was lacking. For example, in Leichtman v. WLW Jacor
Communications, the court held that allegations that the defendant
intentionally blew cigar smoke in the plaintiffs face "for the purpose
of causing physical discomfort, humiliation, and distress" sufficiently
stated a cause of action for battery. 86 The court reasoned that tobacco
smoke is a "particulate matter" and therefore has the physical
properties capable of making contact. 87 This willingness to extend the
tort of battery to nontraditional forms of contact lends support for
classification of upskirt photography as a battery. Moreover, there is a
colorable argument that when photographers use flashes, the photons
emitted from the flash-like the particulate matter in secondhand
smoke cases-has similar physical properties capable of making
contact. 188
181. KEETON ET AL., supra note 179, § 9, at 39.
182. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 18, cmt. c at 31 (1965).
183. Fisher v. Carrousel Motor Hotel, Inc., 424 S.W.2d 627, 629 (Tex. 1967) ("[I]t has long
been settled that there can be a battery without an assault, and that actual physical contact is
not necessary to constitute a battery, so long as there is contact with clothing or an object closely
identified with the body.").
184. See Morgan v. Loyacomo, 1 So. 2d 510, 511 (Miss. 1941) ("To constitute an assault and
battery, it is not necessary to touch the plaintiffs body or even his clothing; knocking or
snatching anything from plaintiffs hand or touching anything connected with his person, when
done in an offensive manner, is sufficient.").
185. See, e.g., Fisher, 424 S.W.2d at 629 ("The intentional snatching of an object from one's
hand is as clearly an offensive invasion of his person as would be an actual contact with the
body.").
186. 634 N.E.2d 697, 698, 700 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994).
187. Id. at 699.
188. This argument is bolstered by the existence of claims for light trespass. See, e.g.,
Amanda Hess Corp. v. Havener, No. 355418 (KCL), 2009 WL 323369, at *7 (Mass. Land Ct.
2009). Light trespass occurs when unwanted light enters another's property. For example, light
trespass occurs when spill light from a streetlight enters a window and illuminates the inside of
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Finally, upskirt photography itself illustrates why the tort of
battery should not always require proof of "contact." Even when
upskirt photographers do not actually come into contact with their
victims, permitting recovery for these types of invasions serves the
normative goal of preventing the more egregious conduct that may
result if photographers are allowed to test the limits of noncontact
physical proximity without fear of liability.
Assuming that plaintiffs could dispose of the contact element
under one of these theories, a reviewing court would then ask whether
the contact was harmful or offensive.189 Permitting courts to engage in
this inquiry would more accurately align judicial outcomes with
societal values regarding invasions of a person's inviolability. For
example, in a case like Nussenzweig, a court would most likely not find
the contact harmful or offensive. By contrast, in a case like Glas, a
court probably would find the contact offensive. An element of intent
distinguishes these cases. In upskirt cases like Glas, photographers
intend to invade their subjects' privacy. Other forms of street
photography lack this element. For example, the photographer in
McNamara had no intention of invading his subjects' privacy when he
captured his image. The photographer did not know that he would
capture the plaintiff in an exposed state; as previously discussed, the
questionable content of the photograph could not have been seen by
the naked eye.190 Intent, then, can inform a court's inquiry into the
offensiveness of the act.
V. CONCLUSION
Notwithstanding the particularly disturbing consequences of
street shootings, numerous doctrinal hurdles currently prevent
individuals from recovering for photographic invasions of their
privacy: deeply rooted conceptions regarding an individual's
expectation of privacy, assumption of risk, the public-record aspect of
photography, and freedom of expression. In many cases, disallowing
recovery may be desirable-for example, if an individual assumed the
risk of being photographed or if the resulting photograph had
unquestionable First Amendment value. However, analysis of
photographic invasion-of-privacy cases shows that there is no clear
line between acceptable and unacceptable intrusions. Advancements
a person's home. The recognition of such claims suggests that light has physical properties and
can be invasive.
189. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 18, cmt. c at 31 (1965).
190. See supra Part II.A.
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in technology will only exacerbate this problem by causing an increase
in both the number and offensiveness of invasions of privacy.
At a time when offensive uses of photographic technology
threaten basic precepts of human dignity, reexamination of invasions
of privacy is necessary. As Professor Clay Calvert observed,
"Continuous review is necessary so that evolutions in technology do
riot ... outstrip developments in the law of voyeurism." 191 To this end,
this Note joins the body of scholarship that advocates for an expansion
of the right to privacy to account for invasions that occur in public
places. However, it argues that current approaches cannot adequately
protect victims of invasive photography because of the heavy weight
courts place on the First Amendment value of photographs.
This Note thus proposes an expansion of the tort of battery to
include offensive forms of street shootings. Such an approach allows
recovery even in the face of many of the concerns courts have
expressed in denying photographic invasion-of-privacy claims. By
focusing on the offensiveness of the act of photographing itself,
recovery under the tort of battery does not undermine the values
protected by the First Amendment and further obviates the need to
rebut arguments such as the public-record theory. Reconceptualizing
certain street shootings as a form of battery also eliminates the need
to determine whether a right to privacy exists in the public sphere, as
battery can occur in both private and public places. In addressing
these concerns, this approach permits courts to refocus their inquiry
on the offensiveness of the invasion in order to reach results that are
more consistent with societal conceptions of dignity.
Nancy Danforth Zeronda*
191. Calvert & Brown, supra note 6, at 474.
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